Building a hydrogen infrastructure system is critical to supporting the development of alternatefuel vehicles. This report provides a methodology for implementing a performance-based design of an outdoor hydrogen refueling station that does not meet specific prescriptive requirements in NFPA 2, The Hydrogen Technologies Code. Performance-based designs are a code-compliant alternative to meeting prescriptive requirements. Compliance is demonstrated by comparing a prescriptive-based fueling station design with a performance-based design approach using Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methods and hydrogen risk assessment tools. This template utilizes the Sandia-developed QRA tool, Hydrogen Risk Analysis Models (HyRAM), which combines reduced-order deterministic models that characterize hydrogen release and flame behavior with probabilistic risk models to quantify risk values. Each project is unique and this template is not intended to account for site-specific characteristics. Instead, example content and a methodology are provided for a representative hydrogen refueling site which can be built upon for new hydrogen applications.
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. Throughout this template, an example hydrogen refueling station is used to illustrate the application of a performance-based design. [Groth 2012] and [Groth 2014 ].
CONTENTS

TABLES
Methodology
At present, HyRAM utilizes generic statistical data for hydrogen component failure rates and hydrogen ignition events. In future applications, site-specific data should be used when available.
How to Use this Document
A template of a performance-based design brief is provided in the remaining section of this document. At the beginning of each section, a paragraph in italics is included that provides guidance on the type of information intended for the respective section. Following the guidance, example content is provided for a representative hydrogen refueling site. Blanks for site-specific information are provided where appropriate. The focus of this document is to demonstrate an approach to performance-based design using a combination of deterministic and probabilistic analysis specifically provided in the HyRAM toolkit. The deterministic models are those that characterize a hydrogen leak or fire based on physical behavior and validated by experimental results. The probabilistic models are those whose outputs are probability distributions. Because of this, less attention is paid to the details of the site-specific information, beyond that which is necessary to demonstrate the approach.
PROJECT SCOPE
Project Description
This section the template contains general introductory information about the project station and the purpose of the design project.
The scope of this project was to provide a design for a public, retail hydrogen refueling station that utilizes a bulk liquefied hydrogen (LH2) storage tank, vaporizers, compressors, gaseous hydrogen dispensers, and other associated components. The station is new construction and built at an existing gasoline fueling site. The station is located in an urban area in the State of California.
The purpose of conducting this activity was to evaluate an alternative to specific prescriptive separation distances.
The intent was to demonstrate that the performance-based design meets the same fire safety goals and objectives as a prescriptive design. This was achieved by comparing a fully code-compliant, prescriptive-based fueling station design with a performance-based design approach utilizing QRA methods.
Codes and Standards
This section includes citations of the various applicable codes that apply for the project. The system analyzed was the refueling station shown in Figure 1 .The system consisted of the following major components:
Fueling Station Description
 3500 gallon (910kg) liquid hydrogen (LH2) storage tank with operating parameters of 150 psi and -260 o F  Vaporizer (kg/hr rating)  Three compressors  A bank of high pressure gaseous hydrogen storage cylinders (300, 600, and 900 bar) for cascade filling of vehicles  Underground, jointless stainless steel piping from storage bank to dispenser island  1-2 dual hose dispensers  Station rated at a 300 kg/day capacity This station was based on the near-term liquid station designed as a reference station under the H2First initiative [Pratt 2014 ]. The near-term station used a cryogenic liquid storage tank and ambient air evaporator to supply hydrogen to the compressor. The piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) for this station is included in Figure 2 . 
Stakeholders
Submittal Schedule
Based on the local building permit department for the jurisdiction of the project site, a submittal schedule should be developed and included in this section of the template. Each specific project deliverable must be identified as well as the approval authority.
An example submittal schedule is provided in Table 2 . The majority of the hydrogen system, including the storage tanks, vaporizer, and dispensing equipment, is located outdoors in the open air. The compressors and associated electrical equipment are located in a non-combustible container-type enclosure that is not normally occupied. These enclosures are accessed only for periodic maintenance activities. Therefore, this analysis was primarily concerned with people who are situated outdoors, such as members of the general public who are refueling their vehicles.
Occupant and Use Profile
For this project, six members of the public were assumed to be onsite, on average. This was based on two people located near the hydrogen dispenser, two people in the vicinity of the door to the convenience store, and two people located near the gasoline pumps. Employees of the station were located in the retail store building onsite and would not be subject to effects of any events associated with the hydrogen system as they were shielded by the building structure. The station was assumed to be open to the public 18 hours per day, 360 days per year (6,480 hr/yr). For the purposes of quantifying the risk, it was estimated that the station fuels 50 vehicles per day. This estimate was based on the rated capacity of the hydrogen system.
Fire Service Characteristics
This section includes information about responding emergency services and response times. The fire safety goal for the hydrogen fueling station was to provide an acceptable level of risk to the public and hydrogen fueling station occupants in the event of a fire or similar emergency. The specific goals for the performance-based design of hydrogen fueling station were stipulated in NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, 2011 Edition. The performance-based goals and objectives specified in NFPA 2 were identical to the prescriptive goals and objectives. This code structure ensures that performance-based designs meet the intent of the prescriptive code requirements which, by definition, meet the goals and objectives.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
A stakeholder objective determines the stakeholder's level of acceptable or sustainable loss. The design objective differs in that it is the performance benchmark against which the predicated performance of a design is evaluated.
Safety-from-Fire
Goal
The fire safety goal was to provide life safety to facility occupants and the public in the event of a fire or similar emergency.  Facilities shall be designed, constructed, and maintained to protect occupants who are not intimate with the initial fire development for the amount of time needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend in place.  Facilities shall be designed, located, and constructed to reasonably protect adjacent persons from injury or death as a result of a fire.  Operations shall be conducted at facilities in a safe manner that minimizes, reduces, controls, or mitigates the risk of fire injury or death for the operators, while protecting the occupants not intimate with initial fire development for the amount of time needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend in place.  Facilities shall be designed and constructed to provide reasonable access for emergency responders and to provide reasonable safety for fire fighters and emergency responders during search and rescue operations.
The refueling system components containing hydrogen are located outdoors and are not enclosed within a structure, with the exception of the metal structure containing the electrical equipment and compressor that is not normally occupied. Therefore search and rescue operations were not anticipated within a structure.
The design objective was to provide the same level of risk from fire for the performance-based design as is provided by the prescriptive requirements, as calculated by the HyRAM QRA risk metrics baseline values for a station that complies with all prescriptive code requirements.
Safety-During-Facility-Use
Goals
The Safety-During-Facility-Use goal for this project was to provide an environment for the occupants that is reasonably safe during the normal use of the building. [NFPA 2: 4.2.3.2.1]
Objectives
The stakeholder objective prescribed by NFPA 2 [4.2.3.2.2] was that the performance-based design shall be in accordance with the requirements of the adopted building code. For this project, the California Building Code, 2013 Edition, was the adopted building code.
The design objective was to provide the same level of overall risk for the performance-based design as was provided by the prescriptive requirements, as calculated by the HyRAM QRA risk metrics baseline values for a station that complies with all prescriptive code requirements.
Safety-from-Hydrogen Hazards
Goal
The safety-from-hydrogen hazards goal prescribed in NFPA 2 was to provide an environment for the occupants in and adjacent to a facility that is reasonably safe from exposures to adverse effects from hydrogen hazards present therein. [NFPA 2: 4.2.3.3.1]
Objectives
The stakeholder objectives prescribed by NFPA 2 [4.2.3.3.2] were:
 The storage, use, or handling of hydrogen in a facility shall be accomplished in a manner that provides a reasonable level of safety for occupants and for those adjacent to a building or facility from health hazards, illness, injury, or death during normal storage, use, or handling operations and conditions.  The storage, use, or handling of hydrogen in a facility shall be accomplished in a manner that provides a reasonable level of safety for occupants and for those adjacent to a building or facility from illness, injury, or death due to the following conditions: o An unplanned release of hydrogen. o A fire impinging upon the hydrogen piping or containment system or the involvement of hydrogen in a fire. o The application of an external force on the hydrogen piping or containment system that is likely to result in an unsafe condition.
These stakeholder objectives were used to develop the various hydrogen hazard scenarios evaluated by the performance criteria for this project. The design objective was to provide the same level of risk from hydrogen hazards for the performance-based design as was provided by the prescriptive requirements, as calculated by the HyRAM QRA risk metrics baseline values for a station that complies with all prescriptive code requirements.
Property Protection
Goal
The property protection goal prescribed by NFPA 2 [4.2.4.1] was to limit damage created by a fire, explosion, or event associated with gaseous or liquid hydrogen to a reasonable level to the facility and adjacent property.
Objectives
The stakeholder objectives prescribed by NFPA 2 [4.2.4.2] were:
 Prevention of Ignition. The facility shall be designed, constructed, and maintained, and operations associated with the facility shall be conducted, to prevent unintentional explosions and fires that result in failure of or damage to adjacent compartments, emergency life safety systems, adjacent properties, adjacent outside storage, and the facility's structural elements.  Fire Spread and Explosions. In the event that a fire or explosion occurs, the building or facility shall be sited, designed, constructed, or maintained, and operations associated with the facility shall be conducted and protected, to reasonably reduce the impact of unwanted fires and explosions on the adjacent compartments, emergency life safety systems, adjacent properties, adjacent outside storage, and the facility's structural elements.  Structural Integrity. The facility shall be designed, constructed, protected, and maintained, and operations associated with the facility shall be conducted, to provide a reasonable level of protection for the facility, its contents, and adjacent properties from building collapse due to a loss of structural integrity resulting from a fire.  Hydrogen Hazards. The facility shall be designed, constructed, and maintained, and operations associated with the facility shall be conducted, to provide reasonable property protection from damage resulting from fires, explosions, and other unsafe conditions associated with the storage, use, and handling of hydrogen therein.
These stakeholder objectives were also used to develop the various hydrogen hazard scenarios evaluated by the performance criteria for this project. The design objective was to provide the same level of risk from hydrogen hazards for the performance-based design as was provided by the prescriptive requirements, as calculated by the HyRAM QRA risk metrics baseline values for a station that complies with all prescriptive code requirements.
Public Welfare
A public welfare facility is a building that provides a public welfare role for the community. The hydrogen refueling station does not provide a public welfare role; therefore, the goals and objectives for public welfare given in NFPA 2 did not apply.
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
This section contains a discussion and listing of the performance criteria used to evaluate the performance-based design.
Performance criteria refine the design objectives into values against which the performance of proposed design approaches can be evaluated. For the design of the hydrogen refueling station, the performance criteria were primarily based on risk values calculated by HyRAM. Specifically the average individual risk (AIR) risk metric was used in the evaluation of design alternatives. Calculated values can also be compared to AIR values for other facilities and occupational hazard values, such as risk exposure at traditional gasoline stations.
Tenability criteria, such as radiant heat flux, temperature or peak overpressure, were also used as performance criteria for specific objectives in this project. HyRAM was also used to calculate these values using the stand-alone "physics mode" which characterizes hydrogen release behavior as well as jet flame and explosion overpressure effects.
NFPA 2 also provided specific performance criteria which need to be met for each required design scenario, assumption, and design specification. The performance criteria applicable to this outdoor hydrogen refueling station application are presented in Table 3 . The hydrogen system is not located within a building structure that is occupied. The performance criterion for any potential effects from an explosion on the occupied retail store building is 15 kPa for this design.
Probit functions were used in lieu of point values for harm criteria for both fire and explosions because the harm level is a function of both the heat flux intensity and the duration of exposure for thermal radiation. Harm from radiant heat fluxes is expressed in terms of a thermal dose unit which combines the heat flux intensity and exposure time [Groth 2012 ]. To characterize harm from overpressure, several probit models were available in the literature for various effects of overpressure including, lung hemorrhage, head impacts, structural collapse, and debris impact. For this outdoor refueling station, structural collapse was not a credible harm scenario; therefore the Eisenberg probit model for lung hemorrhage was used.
Personnel exposed to low oxygen concentrations can develop hypoxia, where the body is deprived of adequate oxygen supply. The concentration associated with judgmental incapacitation, and therefore impairs one's ability to act to prevent injury or move to safety, is approximately 12% oxygen [SPFE 2012] . Because this level could affect a person's ability to judge which direction is safe to move, this value was used as the performance criteria for exposure to liquid hydrogen (hazardous material exposure).
Liquid hydrogen is typically stored at 20K (-423°F) in a cryogenic, vacuum-insulated storage tank. If a leak were to occur, the liquid hydrogen would be heated and turn into vapors and gases which could freeze human tissue. Prolonged exposure of the skin or contact with cold surfaces, for example the metal storage tank, can cause frostbite. For example, a wind speed of 15mph and an air temperature of -40°F could result in frostbite with an exposure time of less than 5 minutes [USARIEM 2001] . A localized temperature criteria of no lower than -50 o F (227K)for exposure was used based on frostbite temperatures for <5minute exposure time.
The performance criterion specified for emergency responder protection was correlated to the amount of pressure needed to collapse unreinforced concrete or cinderblock walls [LaChance 2011] and represents the hazard of an outdoor hydrogen explosion impacting the retail store on where employees are located and emergency responders may be expected to conduct search and rescue operations. Because the hydrogen system does not enter the retail store at any time and the air intakes for the building meet the prescriptive separation distances, an internal hydrogen explosion in the retail store was not considered. However, the impact of an external hydrogen explosion is examined. For this reason, the performance criterion of a peak pressure force on the retail building, where emergency responders may conduct rescue operations during an emergency event, was specifically characterized and used to evaluate trial designs.
The performance criterion stipulated by NFPA 2 for public welfare buildings was not addressed in this design brief because it does not apply to the outdoor hydrogen fueling station application. The dismissal of this goal has been approved by stakeholders. As discussed in the Goals and Objectives, the hydrogen refueling station was not considered to be serving a public welfare role; therefore no public welfare performance criteria are used in this design. 
DESIGN SCENARIOS
Assumptions
All assumptions made during the development of the design scenario need to be identified and listed in this section. For this template, the assumptions prescribed specifically by NFPA 2 are listed.
• For fire scenarios, only a single fire source was assumed to be present. Multiple, simultaneous fire events were not considered. • For the hazardous material release scenarios, multiple simultaneous unauthorized releases of hazardous materials from different locations were not considered.
• Combinations of multiple events were not considered. Table 4 provides an overview of each design scenario selected for the evaluation of design alternatives. Each scenario is discussed in more detail. An unrelated vehicle fire at the gasoline dispensing pump.
Required Design Scenarios
Flame radiation from vehicle fire calculation using SFPE calculation methods Hazardous Material Scenario 3-Application of an external factor to the hazardous material that is likely to result in a fire, explosion, toxic release, or other unsafe condition. [NFPA 2: 5.4.4.3] Seismic event where a pipe bursts (100% leak size on largest pipe).
HyRAM risk metric calculation
Hazardous Material Scenario 4-Unauthorized discharge with each protection system independently rendered ineffective. [NFPA 2: 5.4.4.4] A hydrogen discharge where the interlock fails.
Discussion of layered safety features present in the system
Fire Scenario
In this design scenario, a component associated with the hydrogen dispensing equipment was assumed to develop a leak, ignite immediately and result in a jet fire. Because explosive conditions are dealt with independently in other design scenarios, only the effects of a fire were considered in this scenario. The HyRAM QRA risk tool incorporates the thermal probit model specified in the performance criteria: Tsao and Perry. HyRAM calculated the variety of potential hydrogen leak rates and sizes and resulting jet fire flame lengths and heat fluxes. These parameters in turn provided the resulting thermal dose that is weighed against the probit model to arrive at a potential harm value. HyRAM was used to calculate the baseline risk value for a station compliant with all prescriptive requirements in order to form a comparison basis for the risk values. The input values for all parameters in the HyRAM baseline fire risk calculation are presented in Table 5 . Because the leak was presumed to occur at the dispenser, only those components containing hydrogen and located at and within the dispenser were included in the component equipment counts. Also, all delayed ignition probabilities within the HyRAM model were set to zero so that the resulting risk values are based solely on the effects of an immediate jet fire.
The HyRAM risk result for these input parameters is:
AIR Fire: 1.05 E-04 fatalities per year This value represents the fire risk presented by a hydrogen refueling station that was fully compliant with the prescriptive requirements of the applicable codes. This baseline value was used as the comparison value when comparing various trial designs.
Explosion Scenario 1 -Pressure Vessel Burst
All hydrogen storage containers in the system will be equipped with pressure relieving devices designed to operate and limit the pressure to the maximum allowable working pressure for cylinder and associate piping. Each stage of the compressed hydrogen storage was identified, along with the maximum allowable working pressure at which the components were rated. For this template, example stages and pressures are listed in Table 6 . High Pressure Cylinders 900 1000
In the case that a pressure relief device were to fail by not opening (stuck shut), all cylinders are designed according to a leak before burst specification using the criteria set out in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII Division III Article KD-141 using standard fracture toughness KIc. This extra layer of protection from pressure vessel burst is not required by the California Building Code or NFPA 2.
Given this extra level of protection, no credible pressure vessel burst scenario existed for this system.
Explosion Scenario 2 -Deflagration
This scenario consisted of a leak developing in a compressor located in the modular container enclosure housing electrical equipment and hydrogen compressors. A mass of hydrogen escaped into the enclosure prior to finding an ignition source. A subsequent deflagration developed.
The enclosure dimensions are 2.72 m wide by 4.28 m long by 3.2 m tall, with a corresponding total volume of 101.3 m 3 . It is estimated that the equipment takes up 45% of this volume. The remaining volume of air is 55.7 m 3 , which is used as the available volume for calculating potential explosive concentrations of hydrogen.
The most likely leak size for a compressor is 0.01% of the pipe diameter, based on calculations documented in [LaChance 2009 ]. Using the rated capacity of the compressors, 27 kg/hr (0.45 kg/min), a value of 0.0045 kg/min was used to represent this leak rate. The flow rate provided by the exhaust ventilation system was 23.4 m 3 /min. The exhaust vent for the enclosure was a 2.1 m by 0.75 m vent in the ceiling; however the vent was a raised rectangular shape equipped with louvers to prevent rain from entering the enclosure. A value of 50% of the vent size was used in the model to represent the available vent area. The Lowesmith model [Ekoto, 2011] was run to determine the steady state hydrogen concentration that will accumulate from the most frequent leak rate. The height of the accumulated hydrogen layer and the resulting hydrogen concentration in this layer are shown in Figure 3 . The resulting hydrogen concentration was 0.8% hydrogen, well below the 4% lower explosive limit for hydrogen.
Figure 3: Hydrogen Concentration Resulting From Most Probable Compressor Leak Rate
Further analysis was conducted to determine the leak rate that would result in a hydrogen concentration at least 4%. Using an iterative process and varying the leak size and rate, it was determined that a leak rate of 0.0497 kg/min would be necessary to achieve a 4% concentration of hydrogen in the enclosure. See Figure 4 for the Lowesmith model results for a 4% mole fraction of hydrogen. This was compared to the corresponding rated capacity for the compressor. For this leak sixe, the maximum mass flow rate necessary to cause an explosive mixture of hydrogen and air cannot be reached by this compressor, even with a 100% leak size. Additionally, the ventilation in the enclosure is designed to activate when a concentration of 1% hydrogen is detected, therefore, a potentially explosive atmosphere will be prevented. -1 } where p 0 is the ambient pressure, V T and V H2 are the total enclosure volume and expanded volume of hydrogen following the release, respectively, χ stoich is the hydrogen-air stoichiometric mole fraction, σ is the expansion ratio for stoichiometric hydrogen-air combustion, and γ is the air specific heat ratio.
This equation can be used to calculate the potential peak overpressure in an enclosure. However, because the most probable leak rate resulted in a steady state concentration well below the lower explosive level for hydrogen, a potential explosion was not a credible scenario.
Explosion Scenario 3 -Detonation
Given that the hydrogen components are located outdoors where hydrogen will readily disperse due to its low density and natural buoyancy, the most conservative credible scenario for a detonation to occur is in the vent stack from the liquid hydrogen storage tank. "Hydrogen-air mixtures can exist in the vent system at concentrations with in the flammable range. This can lead to a deflagration or detonation of the hydrogen-air mixture inside the vent stack… This typically occurs when the hydrogen flow initially starts and before the residual air has been purged from the vent piping" [CGA G-5.5, 2014] NFPA 2 required vent stacks for bulk liquid hydrogen systems to be designed and built according to CGA G-5.5, Hydrogen Vent Systems.
The vent stack on the liquid hydrogen storage tank was considered in this scenario. This vent was expected to be used routinely to bleed off excess pressure that may build up in the tank due to normal heat gain to the cryogenic hydrogen. The vent was operated via a manual valve. The operating procedures for the system specify that the tank will be vented once it achieves a pressure of more than 150 psi. The hydrogen vapor will be vented form the tank down to a tank pressure of 120 psi. To prevent the possibility of a detonation in the vent stack, the CGA G-5. The L/D ratio for this vent pipe has almost a 50% safety factor above that required by the code. As a result, no credible detonation scenario existed for this project.
Hazardous Material Scenario 1 -Unauthorized Release
This scenario involved the release of hydrogen from the liquid storage tank. The release point considered was from a 2.54 cm diameter stainless steel pipe that is part of the pressure build circuit located at the end of the cylindrical tank. The cold plume hydrogen release model was used to characterize the temperature gradient from the release point as well as the hydrogen concentration. To evaluate the oxygen displacement hazard, the hydrogen concentration was used to determine when the oxygen level went below the performance criteria. The input values to the cold plume model are shown in Table 7 . The results of the cold plume model are show graphically in Figure 4 . The plot shows the trajectory and concentration of the stream of saturated liquid hydrogen. It is likely that the release will have a mixture of liquid and vapor phase hydrogen, but the liquid is the most conservative and was used in this analysis. The shaded region shows the flammable extent for the plume. This simulation does not take into account pooling and flow along the ground, nor does it include wind effects. This was the most conservative estimate for the extent of the hydrogen plume. The performance criterion for hypoxia was 12%. To evaluate the extent of this region, the sea level ratio of O 2 to N 2 (20.8 % O 2 and 79.1 % N 2 ) was used to read the hydrogen concentration resulting in 12 % O 2 . The corresponding hydrogen value was calculated as 42.3% H 2 . The shaded region corresponding to this value was within 5 meters of the release point.
Parameter
The temperature gradient resulting from the model for this scenario is shown in Figure 5 . The shaded region depicts the temperature gradient up to the performance criteria of 227K (-50 F). For this scenario, the performance criteria extends to 10 m. 
Hazardous Material Scenario 2 -Exposure Fire
The scenario was required to consider an exposure fire where hazardous materials are stored, used, handled, or dispensed. At a gasoline station, the most likely exposure fire is a vehicle fire and this is most likely to occur at the dispensing pumps or on the public street due to an accidental collision. This scenario analyzed the impact of a vehicle fire on the hydrogen dispenser system. The dispenser area was chosen for analysis over the hydrogen storage area because the dispenser is located closer to potential exposure fires (i.e. a vehicle fire). The nearest location from the hydrogen dispenser where a hydrocarbon-powered vehicle is anticipated was at the gasoline dispenser. This location was analyzed in order to provide the most conservative value for the exposure fire hazard. A hydrogen-fueled vehicle, utilizing the hydrogen dispenser, would be located closer to the hydrogen system, however, this vehicle was not considered in this scenario because NFPA 2 [NFPA2: 10.3.1.14.13] stated specifically that vehicles shall not be considered a source of ignition.
NFPA 502, the Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and other Limited Access Highways, stated that the representative heat release rate for a single passenger vehicle is equal to 5 MW [8] . The SFPE Guide, Chapter 10, titled "Fire Hazard Calculations for Large, Open Hydrocarbon Fires" provided a calculation method for radiative heat flux based on heat release rate and distance from the point source to the target.
The distance from the nearest gasoline dispenser where the exposure fire is assumed to take place to the hydrogen dispenser was 6.7 m. The heat flux is expressed by Equation 2.
Equation 2 '' = 4 2 Where: Q = 5 MW (heat flux from vehicle fire) χ r = 0.3 (radiative heat fraction) R = 6.7 m (distance from center of fire to the edge of the target)
The resulting incident heat flux becomes:
This exposure heat flux value for the prescriptive requirement was compared to the performancebased requirement if the distance between the gasoline fueling dispenser and the hydrogen is impacted by the trial designs.
Hazardous Material Scenario 3 -External Event
In this hazardous material scenario, it was assumed that a seismic event occurs that results in shearing motion that is of a largest enough magnitude to result in a 100% leak of the largest pipe in the hydrogen system. Because explosive conditions are dealt with independently in other design scenarios, only the effects of a fire were considered in this scenario. The HyRAM QRA risk tool incorporated the thermal probit model specified in the performance criteria for protection from untenable conditions: Tsao and Perry. For the scenario, the HyRAM inputs were set to force a 100% leak of the largest pipe. These parameters provided the resulting thermal dose that was weighed against the probit model to arrive at a potential harm value. HyRAM was used to calculate the baseline risk value for a station compliant with all prescriptive requirements in order to form a comparison basis for the risk values. The input values for all parameters in the HyRAM baseline fire risk calculation are presented in Table 8 . This value represents the fire risk presented by a hydrogen refueling station that is fully compliant with the prescriptive requirements of the applicable codes. This baseline value was used as the comparison value when comparing various trial designs when considering the protection from fire objectives. It is important to note that this risk value is conditional based on the occurrence of an earthquake that shears off the largest hydrogen pipe in the system, and is considered a conditional risk value.
Hazardous Material Scenario 4 -Discharge with Protection System Out of Service
This scenario consisted of an unintentional hydrogen release with each protection system independently rendered ineffective. In this example, the analyzed protection system had interlocks that were responsible for shutting down the release of hydrogen. Because there was no sprinkler system or other emergency egress protection system, the interlock was the only protection system that is available for an evaluation of this type.
The interlocks consisted of fault-tolerant digital logic controllers which shut down the flow of hydrogen at several air-operated, fail-safe shut-off valves. If air pressure is lost at any time, these valves close automatically. Therefore the reliability of the digital logic controllers was the only value examined in this analysis. The failure rates reported in the literature covering a wide variety of manufactures and models in the chemical process and nuclear safety industries were considered. The probability that a controller with redundant processors will recover from a single processor failure by successfully switching the control function(s) to the other processor ranged from 98.37% to 99.59% [Paula 1991] .
If the controller failed to activate the interlocks, the hydrogen release would continue until detected manually and an emergency stop button activated. Because the hydrogen system is located outdoors, the hydrogen will mix with the air and rise rapidly due to the inherent buoyancy. The hazardous materials release scenarios examined previously did not credit the interlocks activating when potential consequences were calculated by the risk analysis. Therefore, the risks of a hydrogen release resulting in a jet flame or an explosion, without the interlocks, are already included in the analysis. Also, given the very high reliability values for digital controllers, no additional risk scenarios were credible.
Scenarios Not Application to this Installation
The scenarios in Table 9 were considered not applicable for an outdoor fueling station. The justification for not including the scenario is included in the table below. No assembly occupancies exist on or nearby the refueling station and there were no building structure exits or entrances to block.
Building Use Design Scenario 2 involves a fire in an area of a building undergoing construction or demolition while the remainder of the building is occupied. The normal fire suppression system in the area undergoing construction or demolition has been taken out of service. [NFPA 2: 5.4.5.2] No partially-occupied buildings with out-of-service suppression system were present to analyze.
Summary of Baseline Design Scenario Results
Table 10 provides a summary of the performance criteria results for each design scenario. For each trial design, design scenarios which involve any changes to the parameters used in calculating the results will be evaluated and compared. 
CONCLUSIONS
This performance-based methodology is intended to compare a hydrogen fueling station that meets all prescriptive-based requirements, based on the NFPA Hydrogen Technologies Code, NFPA 2, 2011, with designs that make alterations to a specific requirement. These alterations are site-specific and are not included in this design brief template which is only intended to establish an approach for meeting using QRA tools to meet the performance-based design requirements in NFPA 2. HyRAM provides one method to establish risk-equivalent designs.
A completed design brief should also include more information on trial designs, design assumptions, critical design features, methods of evaluation, and the record of agreement between all stakeholders. Once complete, it should be presented to the appropriate stakeholders for review and comment. 
